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Petrie: Eroding the Tax Benefits of Wrap-Around Annuities: An Analysis of

ERODING THE TAX BENEFITS OF WRAP-AROUND ANNUITIES:
AN ANALYSIS OF REVENUE RULING 81-225
INTRODUCTION

Certain aspects of life seemingly never change. Just as the cat is constantly
chasing the mouse, the IRS is constantly chasing those who market various
forms of annuity contracts. The most recent and perhaps the boldest attempts
to restrict the tax benefits of annuity contracts occurred in Revenue Ruling
81-225.1 In the Revenue Ruling, the service took the position that owners of
qualified and non-qualified variable annuities that are "wrapped around"
mutual funds available to the general public are not entitled to the special
tax treatment generally accorded annuities. Revenue Ruling 81-225 resurrects
the issue of which contractual relationships will be considered annuities for
the purposes of federal taxation. In addition, a more subtle issue is raised:
should non-qualified deferred annuities be restricted to a retirement, rather
than an investment, function?
Recent controversy has centered around what access and control the policy
holder may retain with respect to the transferred funds without losing advantageous tax treatment. The Service maintains that annuity contracts should
be tested under the tax ownership theory of Clifford v. Helvering.2 This reflects
a policy objection to the use of non-qualified annuities as an investment rather
than retirement device.
The law in this area is chaotic. There is little legislative guidance and the
controlling Revenue Rulings are of questionable validity. This paper will
examine the federal tax treatment of non-qualified annuities and then discuss
the evolution of the present controversy. A consideration of the future use of
non-qualified annuities will conclude the paper.
DEINITIONS

While the Internal Revenue Code does not define the term annuity, the
regulations under section 72 provide basic identification principles. An annuity
is a contract providing for periodic payments to a named payee. Such payments
must commence after a certain date, 3 called the annuitization date, and extend
1. Rev. Rul. 81-225, 198141 I.R.B. 19.
2. 309 U.S. 31 (1940). Clifford involved the issue of how much control a grantor may
retain over assets transferred into a trust. The Court considered several factors, including
the grantor's power to sell corpus assets and reinvest the proceeds without restriction and
reversion of the corpus at the end of a five year term. The Court concluded that the grantor,
not the trust, was the tax-owner of the transferred assets. The issue of tax ownership in
the grantor-trust area is now governed by I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (1976); Clifford's logic is clearly
applicable to annuities. Like a trust arrangement, an annuity involves a transaction in which
the taxpayer attempts to transfer tax-ownership of certain assets to another taxpayer, an
insurance company.
3. The date upon which the periodic payments begin is the date of "annuitization."
This is also referred to as the annuity starting date.
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for any period greater than one year.4 This promise is generally acquired by
the transfer of consideration. The periodic payments consist of both a return
of capital and income earned during the period between contract formation
and the time payments begin.5 Because the payments are to continue for a
specified period measured by a number of years, 6 or measured in terms of a
particular life,7 mortality factors are involved.,
Annuity contracts may be commercial or private. Commercial annuities
are issued by insurance companies, 9 whereas private annuities involve
contractual relations created between individuals in a non-commercial
setting. 10 This paper deals solely with commercial annuities."
Commercial annuities may be further classified according to the nature of
the issuer's obligation. A conventional fixed-dollar annuity is a promise by
the issuer to pay a fixed amount at periodic intervals after annuitization. The
policy holder transfers the premium to the issuer who creates a reserve for
fixed annuities. 12 Under this arrangement, the insurer has both the risk and
the benefit of the investment experience of the policyholder's funds while
guaranteeing the policyholder a certain rate of return. In a variable annuity
contract, the insurer does not guarantee a specific rate of return; 13 instead
the policyholder's return is dependent upon the investment experience of his
account.' 4 The policyholder transfers funds to the insurer who invests those

4. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-2(b)(2)(ii) (1956).
5. See infra note 25.
6. An annuity may provide for a payout that will occur in all events over a certain
term.
7. Under a single life annuity, payments commence at a specific date, such as age 65,
and continue until the death of the annuitant. A joint and survivor annuity is similar to a
single life annuity except that payments will continue for the life of a named beneficiary
after death of the annuitant. For the tax treatment of annuity payments, see infra note 25.
8. "Each issuer assumes the risk of mortality from the moment the contract is issued.
That risk is an actuarial prognostication that a certain number of annuitants will survive to
specified ages. Even if a substantial number live beyond their predicted demise, the company
issuing the annuity - whether it be fixed or variable - is obligated to make the annuity payments on the basis of the mortality prediction reflected in the contract." SEC v. Variable
Annuity Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 70 (1959).
9. I.R.C. § 801(a) defines "Insurance Company."
10. Vernava, Tax Planning for the Not-So-Rich: Variable and PrivateAnnuities, 11 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 8, 8 (1969).
11. Thus far, the Service has focused its attention on commercial annuities. However,
the Service's arguments involving "incidence of ownership" based upon Clifford notions are
clearly applicable to private annuities as well. Further, the alleged tax abuses which the IRS
finds objectionable in the commercial field are equally possible in the private annuity area.
Any legislative solution to annuity problems should encompass both private and commercial
annuities.
12. Such reserves are often required by state insurance law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 625.121
(1981).
13. Annuities may combine fixed and variable characteristics. For example, an annuity
may guarantee a low minimum rate of return or tie the maximum return to the investment
experience of the annuitant's account.
14. Variable annuities are sanctioned in I.R.C. § 801(g)(1)(A) (1976).
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funds in various forms of equity.1 6 The account is credited by income earned
during the accumulation period. 16 Payments commencing upon annuitization
reflect both the earned income and market value of the policyholder's account.
17
The variable annuity shifts the risk of investment to the policyholder, and
may operate as a hedge against inflation.
Both types of annuities may be immediate or deferred depending upon the
annuitization date. Under an immediate annuity, payments to the policyholder
commence within a short period after the transfer of funds to the issuer. A
deferred annuity involves an accumulation period between the policyholder's
transfer and annuitization. Variations of the deferred variable annuity have
triggered IRS reaction.
FEDERAL TAX

TREATMENT OF ANNUITIES

The Policyholder
There are no tax consequences to a policyholder when cash is transferred
to purchase an annuity contract. If, however, the policyholder transfers appreciated property to the issuer, taxable gain or loss will result under I.R.C.
§ 1001.18 During the accumulation period, income earned and credited to the
policyholder's account is taxable to the insurer at marginal rates,29 rather
than to the policyholder. 20 Because most annuity contracts contain ,the right
22
2
to both partial and total cash surrender, ' constructive receipt prindples
would seem to govern, absent a penalty for exercise of the cash surrender
option.
There is a strong reason for the inapplicability of constructive receipt
theory to income earned during the accumulation period. By legislative grace,
Congress has consistently taxed amounts in excess of the invested funds only

15. The underlying investment is normally in corporate equities so the policyholder's
account will hopefully keep pace with inflation.
16. These amounts are typically adjusted for charges incurred in maintaining the account.
17. In a pure variable annuity, the policyholder assumes the risk that the return on his
account might not keep up with inflation. By contrast, in a fixed annuity setting, the insurer
bears t&e risk of investment because the rate of return is guaranteed. See Investment Annuity,
Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 690-91 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980).
18. See Skipper, The Investment Annuity, 33 C.L.U.J. 11, 14 (1979).
19. For a summary of the complexities of life insurance company taxation, see Kaufman,
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 337 (1963).
20. The standing principle of annuity taxation is that the return above the annuitant's
investment will not be taxed until the payout begins. See generally, Vernava, supra note 10,
at 10-12 (given a detailed description of the history of taxation upon annuitization).
21. The district court in Investment Annuity, Inc. stated that that the annuity contract
at issue was virtually identical to all variable annuities, varying in only certain respects. The
partial cash surrender option was not listed as a difference, nor was existence of that right
objectionable to the court. 442 F. Supp. at 690-91.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1A51-2(a) (1965) (generally, a taxpayer is taxed on income not actually
received when the income is earned, set aside for the taxpayer and receipt is not subject to
any substantial limitations.)
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when payout commences. 23 Thus the statute, rather than constructive receipt
2 4
theory, governs the taxation of investment income to the annuitent
Upon annuitization the deferral continues during the payout period.
I.R.C. § 72(a) requires amounts received under an annuity contract in the tax
year in excess of the excludable portion to be included in gross income.
Section 72(b) provides a ratio for determining the excludable amount. 25 Since
this formula provides for a ratable recovery of capital, it results in spreading
taxation of the earned income over the payout period. Each year the entire
includable amount is taxed as ordinary income; 26 thus the price for the tax
deferral is the loss of the I.R.C. § 1202 capital gain deduction that would have
resulted if the same money was invested in capital appreciation property. In
sum, if the contract is an annuity, the resulting deferral of income may yield
significant tax savings if the policyholder is in a lower tax bracket during the
payout period than during the accumulation period.
Tax Impact to the Insurance Company
The I.R.C. § 801(a) definition of a life insurance company requires that the
"company's life insurance reserves" plus other amounts exceed 50 percent
of total reserves. Life insurance reserves are defined by section 801(b) as
reserves based on mortality tables that are set aside for contracts including
annuities. Most variable annuity contracts require section 801(g)(1)(B) reserves based upon segregated asset accounts, and these qualify as section
801(b) reserves. Thus, a company issuing only annuities will qualify as a life
insurance company.
Determining whether the issuer is a "life insurance company" for the
purposes of federal taxation is critical. 27 Under the special taxation scheme of
I.R.C. § 802,28 a life insurance company's investment income is taxed at a
23. I.R.C. § 72(a), (b) (1976). For a history of the various methods employed by Congress
to tax the amount in excess of the annuitant's investment see Vernava, supra note 10, at 10-12.
24. Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 761 (1961). This was cited by the
marketer on appeal. Brief for Appellant 48, Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal 609 F.2d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980).
25. I.R.C. § 72(a) (1976) provides the following formula for determining what portion
of an annuity payment is a non-taxable return of capital:
Total investment in the contract
X payments received = Non-taxable return of capital
Total
Total expected________expected Teturn
Any amount received in excess of the excluded amount is taxed as ordinary income. This
ratio applies to all payments regardless of whether the taxpayer dies before recovering the
investment, or outlives the assumed life expectancy and receives payments which do not
represent return of capital. Waller v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 665, 678-79 (1963).
26. I.R.C. § 72(a) (1976). The amounts are considered as interest even though they
might be attributable to appreciation of capital assets.
27. See Kaufman, supra note 19, at 337. "Life insurance companies are generally classified
as 'financial intermediaries,' institutions which act as a medium of savings for individuals
and as a source of investment funds for the economy. Unlike other intermediaries, which hold
deposit type savings, life insurance companies perform the long term function of providing
financial protection." Id.
28. I.R.C. § 802(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978) states that to the extent of a life insurance
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marginal rate. Thus there is a minimal charge to the policyholder's accountand no double taxation when the policyholder subsequently receives the
earned income in annuity payments taxed under I.R.C. § 72. In conjunction
with section 72, section 802 operates to defer tax on earned income, thereby
increasing the attractiveness of annuity investments. If the company does not
qualify as a life insurance company, however, the investment income would
be taxed under ordinary corporate rates,30 and the tax would be passed through
to the policyholder thereby defeating the annuity's deferral of income.
The interplay between the insurance taxation provisions and section 72 is
completely dependent upon the contract qualifying as an annuity. The remainder of this paper will trace various attempts by annuity marketers to
increase the investment utility of an annuity and the Service's attempt to
counter these developments.
Developing Confusion: Prelude
to Revenue Ruling 77-85
The first major conflict between the Service and the annuity industry
involved investment annuities. In an investment annuity, the policyholder
transferred funds to a third party custodian, and could make additional
transfers at any time prior to annuitization. The policyholder also had the
option of transferring stocks or bonds from an existing portfolio directly into
the custodial account.3 ' The custodian was required to invest the funds, at the
policyholder's direction, among a group of issuer approved investments- 2
Additionally, the policyholder retained the right to direct the custodian to sell
assets and reinvest the proceeds among investments on the approved list
during both the accumulation and the annuitization periods. The policyholder had the option of terminating the contract in whole or in part and
receiving a cash surrender value less a charge for termination. This option
ended upon annuitization. An important feature of the cash surrender right
company's taxable income, the tax imposed shall be that of a normal corporation. The preferential treatment of life insurance company taxation is found in the definition of "life
insurance company taxable income" under I.R.C. § 802(b) (1976). Basically, the life insurance
company is taxed at a reduced rate on investment income due to the operation of I.R.C. § 804
(1976) and I.R.C. § 805 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) through § 802 (1978). For a summary of this
complicated area of taxation, see Kaufman, supra note 19. For a more detailed analysis see,
T. NAsH, 1 EDERAL TAXATION OF LwE INsuRANcE COmPANmS, § 8.01 (1971).
29.

See supra note 16.

80. I.R.C. § 11 (Supp. II 1978) as amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 231a.
31.

This would trigger I.R.C. § 1001 (1976) and gain or loss would result. See supra text

accompanying note 20.
32. Investments approved by the First Investment Annuity Company of America included:
securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange; mutual funds; United States and -Canadian
Government Bonds; certificates of deposit; savings accounts; debt instruments of corporations
which would reasonably be expected to be listed on an exchange regulated by the Securities

Exchange Commission; commercial paper; term life insurance; and any other asset which
met the company's standard for acceptibiity, which basically required a regular market in
the asset. Furo
INvEsTmENT ANNuITY Co. oF AMERICA, INTRODUMION TO THE INVFSTMENr
ANNUITY 8 (1974).
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was that the policyholder was only entitled to receive cash, and could never
obtain the assets contained in the annuity.
Such arrangements came to be known as a "wrap around" annuities. By
maintaining an investment portfolio through an annuity contract, the investments were wrapped in the tax deferral accorded to annuities. 33 The policyholder had effectively sheltered income producing investments from current
taxation.
The initial cost of this arrangement was significant. The policyholder
was charged a percentage of the cumulative contributions to the account.
The loading charge varied by company. In 1975 the fee ranged between three
and five percent,3 4 which was a significant charge because the average minimum contribution required was about $10,000. 35 The policyholder was also
charged an annual premium and custodian fee which averaged about one
percent of the accumulated contributions per year. 36 The loading charge and
annual premiums were non-refundable. Thus, a policyholder wishing to
exercise the cash surrender option to obtain his account balance would incur
an economic loss.
During the twelve year period from 1965 through 1977 the Service issued
about seventy favorable letter rulings approving beneficial tax treatment for
investment annuities. 7 The rulings stated that reserves attributable to investment annuities qualified as life insurance reserves for the purposes of
section 801(b), thus qualifying the marketer for insurance company taxation.
The rulings further held that the policyholder was not the owner of the assets
ss
in the account and hence not taxable on the current income
These "investment annuities" were not immediately accepted by investors.
By the mid 1970's, however, their sales skyrocketed. They were marketed for
high-tax bracket individuals seeking deferral of income from income earning
39
assets while retaining investment control.
Another important aspect of the investment annuity was that its utility
was limited mainly to income producing assets rather than capital appreciation
property. The initial problem was that if a taxpayer transferred an appreciated asset into his account, I.R.G. § 1001 would be triggered, and taxable gain
33. "The investment annuity, in other words, is attractive chiefly to the well-to-do individual primarily interested in accumulating income under a tax-deferred umbrella." Anreder,
Attractive "Wrapper"- The Investment Annuity Has Begun to Catch On, BAP. ONS NAT'L
Bus. & FIN. WEEKLY, Nov. 17, 1975 at 3.
34. Id. The highest percentage for the contribution in 1974 was 4% for First hivestment
Annuity Company's non-qualified annuity. This percentage, however, applied in the $10,000$249,999 cumulative contribution range. Thus, the policy required a fairly significant front
load. FIRSr INVESTMENT ANNUITY CO. OF AMERICA, PERSONAL INVESTmENT ANNUrrY PoLIcY
11 (Sept. 1974).
35. Anreder, supra note 33, at 14.
36. Id. at 20.
37. In debate, Senator Allen put the number of favorable private letter Rulings at
seventy. 123 CONG. Rvc. 12,933 (1977).
38. See Brief for Appellee at 6-7, Investment Annuity, Inc.
39. See Anreder, supra note 33, at 20. Given the high minimum contribution required
about $10,000, it was clear that these policies were designed for the wealthy. Id. at 14.
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would result.40 More importantly, if the policyholder directed the sale of an
asset, the insurance company would be taxed on any resultant gain and the
account would be decreased by the amount of tax liability generated. 41 The
investment annuity thus sheltered income production, but not taxable gains.

An About Face:Revenue Ruling 77-85
In 1977 the IRS reversed its position on the tax treatment of the investment annuity in Revenue Ruling 77-85.42 The Service took the position that

the control retained by the policyholder supported the conclusion that the
policyholder is the true tax-owner of the "wrapped" assets and should be taxed
currently on income earned under section 6L43 There had been no change in
statutory or judicial tax law in the annuity area during the twelve year
period prior to this Revenue Ruling, thus the IRS action was simply a reversal
of administrative policy.
The ruling effectively slammed the door on the investment annuity. With
the special tax treatment uncertain, companies could no longer market such a
contract. 44 The issuers of these annuities immediately petitioned Congress to

pass legislation suspending Revenue Ruling 77-85 for one year allowing them
time to urge permanent legislative reversal of the Ruling.45 Those favoring
40. See supra text accompanying note 18.
41. This would pass the tax liability through to the annuitant, defeating the tax deferral
objective. The following example illustrates the result:
Assumed long-term capital gain realized within the Segregated Asset Account ...... $1,000
Insurer's long-term capital gains tax* charged against the account ................ 300
Net after tax balance or realized gain ........................................ 700
When balance above is paid out as benefit or cash surrender value
it is taxable to the individual at ordinary income tax rate-Balance
above paid out as annuity benefit or cash surrender value ...................... 700
Individual's assumed tax [assumed tax rate-32%] .............................. 224
476
Individual's net after tax balance
......................................
*[Insurer's tax rate: 48%.short term; 30% long term]
In the above example, the individual lost 52.4% of the realized gain [$524 of $1,000]
to taxes whereas the same $1,000 gain would'have been taxed only once at 16% [ of the
individual's ordinary rate of 32%] if the gain had been incurred by the individual
directly. Obviously, individuals in higher tax brackets would receive even less after-tax
benefit.
The purchase of an Investment Annuity enjoys no tax deduction of purchase price.
Realized capital gains within an Investment Annuity Segregated Asset Account are
subject to onerous double taxation (as illustrated above) and investment income is merely
tax deferred in exactly the same way as any cash value life insurance policy, any fixed
dollar annuity policy or any variable annuity policy issued by any life insurer in the
United States.
123 CONG. Rac. 12,936 (1977).
42. 1977-1 C B. 12.
43. The revenue ruling contained a grandfather clause which allowed 'a continuation
of the preferential tax treatment to taxpayers who had purchased investment annuities prior
to March 9, 1977; however, such.taxpayers were not allowed to make any additional contributions. Id. at 15.
44. One company in this position was First Investment Annuity Company of America.
45. Revenue Ruling 77-85 adversely affected companies relying on the investment annuity
market.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

the Ruling's position, however, viewed the investment annuity as an investment vehicle much the same as a mutual fund. 46 Opponents of the proposed
legislation argued that by allowing investment annuities tax deferral under
sections 801 and 72, Congress would subsidize a form of investment competing
with mutual funds, thereby damaging the mutual fund market.47 The proposal
to reverse Revenue Ruling 77-85 was rejected and Congress thus failed to
resolve the underlying controversy.
The Industry Reacts: Investment
Annuity Inc. v. Blumenthal
After the rejection of the proposed legislation, an annuity marketer sought
a declaratory judgment that Revenue Ruling 77-85 violated the Internal
Revenue Code, and injunctive relief to prevent application of the Ruling. In
Investment Annuity Inc. v. Blumenthal,4s the district court found the Ruling
invalid. The court held that section 801(g)(1)(B) and its legislative history did
not support or deny the position taken in Revenue Ruling 77-85. The court
also rejected the Service's argument that the policyholder retained enough
control to trigger Clifford tax ownership notions, since it felt that a "substantial
change" in the policyholder's economic position had occurred when an investment annuity was purchased. 49 Impressed with the fact that the Revenue Ruling
was a reversal of long standing policy, which was not justified by any change
in the tax law, the court concluded that the ruling was unenforceable.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed on procedural grounds. ° The circuit court never reached the substantive tax issues, thus, Revenue Ruling 77-85's validity is precarious. The
district court decision which declared the ruling invalid is of little precedential
value due to reversal on procedural grounds; however, the decision cannot be
ignored.
The Service Steps up the Attack:
The 1978 Proposal
Simultaneous with its assault on the investment annuity, the Service attacked
non-qualified, deferred annuities in general. The Treasury included a proposal
in the Revenue Act of 1978 to eliminate deferral of income earned during the
accumulation period of any fixed or variable non-qualified deferred annuity.1
46. 123 CoNG. REC. 12,932-37 (1977).
47. Interestingly, it was not pointed out that the market for mutual funds would also
benefit from the investment annuity. Mutual funds are an income producing investment
perfectly suited for purchase through an investment annuity contract.
48. 442 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1978).
49. Id. at 691.
50. Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 7-8, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Essentially, the circuit court avoided the substantive tax issues and stated that only a policyholder would have standing to challenge the ruling.
51. The text of this proposal is contained in: The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and
Reform Proposals:Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Program Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, Part 1 of 9, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 291-303 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
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The proposal emphasized the Service's position that annuities had been given
preferential tax treatment only because of their "traditional role" as a retirement vehide.5 2 The Treasury asserted that the annuity's role had switched
from retirement vehicle to tax shelter. Although the proposal was particularly
critical of investment annuities, the aim was to foreclose preferrential treatment for all non-qualified deferred annuities due to the perceived shift in
use.55
The proposal further emphasized that non-qualified deferred annuities
are viewed as an impediment to the comprehensive retirement systems offered
under qualified deferred compensation plans 4 The logic was that a highly
compensated individual could circumvent the rules prohibiting qualified retirement plans from discriminating in favor of officers, shareholders or highly
compensated individuals 55 by simply purchasing a non-qualified annuity outside the retirement plan. 58 This logic is erroneous since anyone employed,
self-employed or otherwise has the option of enhancing retirement income
through an annuity. What the Treasury was really objecting to was that
7
these annuities may be utilized as tax sheltered investments.
The Treasury proposal was rejected in committee, thus there is no legislative history from which congressional intent could be gleaned.Ps Investment
Annuity and congressional inaction generated such uncertainty that the investment annuity industry had effectively ceased to exist by mid-1978. Despite
this, and the Service's continued hostility toward all non-qualified deferred
annuities the annuity industry responded with new variations.
The Industry Responds: New
"Wrappers" are Born
Since the tax deferral aspect of investment annuities had been so popular,
annuity marketers designated new investment plans to produce the same
effects as the investment annuity. These new annuities basically replicated the
investment annuity with minor changes to appease the Service. The goal remained the same: wrap an income producing asset such as shares in a mutual
fund in an annuity and apply sections 801 and 72 to shelter income earned by
the wrapped assets from current taxation.
At the core of the new annuities were mutual funds and other investment
groupings. Some accounts allowed the policyholder to shift between various
investment groupings; 59 others were more conservative, allowing the policyHearings]. It is important to note that the Treasury expressly exempted annuities under
qualified plans from the amendment. Id. at 299.
52. Id. at 292.
53. Id. at 292-97.
54. Id.
55. See I.I.C. § 401(a)(4y (1976).
56. Hearings,supra note 51, at 298.
57. See supra text accompanying note 55.
58. One observer felt that intense lobbying by the insurance industry was responsible
for the committee's decision. Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1978, at Fl, col. 6.
59. See Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-44 I.R.B. 19, 20.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

holder to switch only between a mutual fund account and a no-risk fund invested primarily in government and triple A industrial bonds. 60 The theory
behind using mutual funds was that the mutual fund manager, not the policyholder, controlled the investment portfolio. The Service seemed to accept
61
this distinction, and these annuities were granted favorable letter rulings.
Soon, annuity contracts were offered as a method of deferring tax on income
earned by investments traditionally offered by savings and loan institutions.
Under these arrangements, the policyholder would transfer funds to an insurer
in exchange for an annuity contract. The insurer would then transfer the
amounts to a bank which would invest the proceeds in a certificate of deposit
or a mutual fund. The policyholder's contractual relation was entirely with
the insurer and not with the bank. The policyholder could withdraw the
funds, less a penalty, if there was a penalty for early withdrawal imposed by
the savings and loan association. Initially, the Service approved these annuities
on the investment control distinction.62
The Service Strikes Back:
Revenue Ruling 80-274
The Service reversed itself again, and denied favorable tax treatment for
the savings and loan annuity in Revenue Ruling 80-274.63 The Service stated
that the policyholder is taxable on income earned by the wrapped assets
under section 61 because of the retention of "substantial incidents of ownership." In the 1980 ruling, an extension of Revenue Ruling 77-85, the Service
did not cite investment control as a rationale for its conclusion. The situation
described in Revenue Ruling 80-274 involved an initial investment in a
certificate of deposit or mutual fund with no power to switch investments.
The Service stated that the policyholder's investment in the certificate of
deposit through the annuity is identical to that of an individual investing
in a certificate of deposit directly through a bank. 64 The Service attacked a
single asset wrap-around annuity to clarify its message: Revenue Rulings 77-85
and 80-274 stand for the proposition that annuity treatment will not be
accorded to transactions which are designed primarily to shield investments
from current income taxation.
The Circle is Closed: Revenue
Ruling 81-225
Combining the logic of Revenue Rulings 77-85 and 80-274, the Service
completed its attack on wrap-around annuities in Revenue Ruling 81-225.15
This Ruling was designed to prevent investors from having the option of
60. See, e.g., TuE VARIABLE LIFE INS. CO., SEPARATE AccoUNT ONE, GROUP UNIT PURCHASE
VARIABLE ANNUITY CONTRACTS, PROSPECTUS (Apr. 30, 1981) (offered under a § 403(b) plan).
61. IRS Does About Face, Attacks "Wrap-Around" Annuities, 53 J. TAX'N 361, 362 (1980).
62. Id.
63. 1980-2 C.B. 27.
64. Id.at 28.
65. 1981-41 LR.B. 19.
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purchasing mutual fund shares through an annuity to produce tax deferral.
A detailed discussion of this ruling is required to understand the present
state of tax law with respect to non-qualified deferred annuities.
The Service again relied on Revenue Ruling 77-85 and narrowed the
issue to tax ownership of the assets wrapped in the annuity.66 The ruling
describes five annuity situations. In four of them, the Service argued that
the policyholder is the true tax owner of the mutual fund and should be
denied preferential tax deferral on income earned by the shares. In each
of these four situations the mutual funds involved were available to the public.
The only situation expressly escaping the Service's attack involved a single
mutual fund managed by the insurance company that was not available to
the general public.
Again, the Service relied on the argument that the policyholder in situations
where the mutual fund the annuity invests in is available to the public is in
the same position as an individual who purchases shares of a mutual fund
directly. The Service stated that even though the policyholder does not manage the portfolio of the mutual fund, the shares of that fund, may be attributed
to the policyholder. With regard to those shares, the Service stated that the
policyholder has sufficient "incidents of ownership," even absent investment
control, to be considered the tax owner.
Mutual funds available to the general public may no longer be the core
of a variable annuity. The policy underlying this revenue ruling is easily
discernible. The Service wishes to eliminate the disparate tax treatment of
those who cloak investments in annuities, and those who invest directly. The
Service is extending the policy that annuity tax treatment should be limited to
funds set aside for retirement purposes, even though Congress rejected this
policy in 1978.
By this series of revenue rulings, the methods by which a non-qualified
deferred variable annuity may function and still qualify for favorable tax treatment have been drastically limited. The rulings are grounded upon logic
contained in Revenue Ruling 77-85. Because of the inconclusive judicial
activity generated by that ruling, the entire area is unsettled, and the tax
issues presented by annuities need close reevaluation. The remainder of this
article will focus on two key issues. First, whether the Service's position is
correct. Second, a determination of the function annuities should perform in
the future.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POSMONs ASSERTED

By

THE IRS IN REVENUE RULINGS

77-85, 80-274 &81-225
Is Revenue Ruling 77-85 Correct?
1. Statutory Problems.
The initial issue is whether an investment annuity fits the statutory
66. The focus was whether the insurance company would be taxed under the marginal
rates while the policyholder is taxed under I.R.C. § 72 (1976), or if the policyholder should
be taxed currently on income earned under I.R.C. § 61 (1976). Rev. Rul. 81-225.
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definition of a variable annuity contract under section 801(g)(1)(a) 7 If the
contract is not a variable annuity, then the reserve held with respect to that
contract will not qualify as a life insurance reserve under section 801(b) and
68
the issuer will not qualify as a life insurance company under section 801(a).
This would subject the company to normal corporate taxation rather than
insurance company taxation. The tax on investment earnings would flow
through to the policyholder in the form of increased premiums thus defeating
tax deferral.
Section 801(g)(1)(A) expressly states that: "For the purposes of this part,
an 'annuity contract' includes a contract which provides for the payment of a
variable annuity computed on the basis of recognized mortality tables and the
investment experience of the company issuing the contract." A key requirement of the statutory definition is the reference to the "[i]nvestment experience
of the company issuing the contract." The regulations do not elaborate on
this requirement except to state that: "A variable annuity differs from the
ordinary or fixed annuity in that the annuity benefits payable under a
variable annuity contract vary with the insurance company's investment experience.""9
This language raises the issue of whether the statute requires that the
insurance company actually control the investment of the policyholder's
funds? 70 The legislative history of this provision does not clarify the issue."'
The plain meaning of the phrase "insurance company's investment experience," however, lends weight to the argument that the phrase implies
the issuer must control the investment. There is, however, a contrary position.
Arguably the term "insurance company's investment experience" means
the investment experience of the company as a whole, whether or not a
portion of that experience is generated by policyholders who control their
accounts. The problem with using this language to determine whether an
investment annuity qualifies as a variable annuity is that the language was
enacted into law prior to the development of investment annuities.7
The district court, in Investment Annuity, Inc., dealt with the "investment experience" language and concluded that the government's argument
that Congress intended to grant only traditional variable annuities preferential
tax treatment was "entirely unpersuasive."' The court held that, "[t]he mere
fact that Congress did not consider an as yet uninvented alternative to a
'statutorily-approved' arrangement cannot be said to bar application of the
statute to a later-invented alternative if the alternative is comparable to the
67. See I.R.C. § 801(g)(1)(B) (1976).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-7(a)(2) (1962).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-7(a)(1) (1962) (emphasis added).
70. This was the argument asserted by the government at the district court level in
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 33-34, Investment Annuity, Inc.. 442 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1977).
71. See S. REP. No. 2109, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 3890, 3896.
72. I.R.C. § 801(g)(1) (1961) was enacted in 1959.
73. 442 F. Supp. at 689.
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'approved' arrangement in substantially all respects."74 The court concluded
that the "investment experience" language should not be read to preclude
investment annuities from receiving preferred statutory treatment.75 The
district court correctly decided this issue, because the "investment experience"
language is by no means dispositive of whether an investment annuity is a
section 801(g)(1)(A) annuity.
The next major issue raised by the revenue ruling is who is the true tax
owner of the assets wrapped in an investment annuity. Initially, the problem
of whether judicial rules of tax ownership apply to this situation must be
resolved. The issuer in Investment Annuity, Inc. argued that section 801(g)
was intended by Congress to control the tax treatment of annuities. Thus, if
the contract complied with the section 801(g)(1)(A) definition of an annuity,
and the reserve qualified under the section 801(g)(1)(B) definition of a segregated asset account, then the income generated from the assets in that account
should be taxable to the life insurance company under section 802. The
insurer maintained that since Congress intended to include variable annuities in the insurance taxation scheme, section 801(g)(1) mandates taxation
of income earned by the wrapped assets to the insurance company.78
A serious defect in the insurer's argument becomes clear when section
802 is considered. Section 802 imposes a tax on the taxable income of every
life insurance company. In Poe v. Seaborn, the United States Supreme Court
held that the term "net income of every individual" is synonomous with
ownership. 77 Thus, the calculation of "insurance company taxable income" is
intrinsically dependent on a finding of tax ownership.
The distinction between constructive receipt and tax ownership must be
discussed. Determining tax ownership involves an examination of the true
relation between the taxpayer and the wrapped investments. A finding that
the policyholder is the true tax owner shifts the tax liability from the
insurance company's preferential rates to the individual's rates under section
61. Constructive receipt is a different issue. Even if it is concluded that the
insurance company is the tax owner of the wrapped investments, the income
earned by those investments could be taxed to the individual in certain
circumstances under constructive receipt notions.

2. Tax Ownership.
Courts have often announced that the rule that using substance rather
than form in characterizing a transaction is "[p]articularly applicable to
annuities and trusts because they are easily susceptible to manipulation so as
to create an illusion."7 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]axation
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Essentially, the issuer in Investment Annuity, Inc. argued that mortality factors
involved in annuity contract liabilities, and reserve requirements imposed by those annuities,
entitled the insurance company to taxation under the insurance provisions under Alinco Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336, 345-49 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
77. 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930) (emphasis added).
78. La Fargue v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 40, 53 (1979) (citing Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 854, 864 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
... 79 These notions are applicable to
command over the property taxed.
investment annuities. The basic theory of tax ownership where there is a
transfer of income producing property 0 is that there must be a "substantial
change" in the transferor's control over the assets in order for tax ownership to
transfer."' A corollary requirement is that there be a substantial change in the
economic position of the transferor8. 2 Both requirements are tested against
the facts and financial reality of the situation at issue.83
In Investment Annuity, Inc., the government asserted that two rights retained by the policyholder in an investment annuity contract were sufficient
to conclude that the policyholder was the tax owner of the wrapped assets.
The most significant was the power to control investment among the list of
approved assets.8 4 The other was the right to make total or partial withdrawals
prior to annuitization.
The district court deemed retention of investment control insufficient to
warrant the conclusion drawn in Revenue Ruling 77-85. The court compared
the situation to the grantor-trust provisions.8 5 Under these provisions, the
income earned by trust assets is taxable to the trust even though the grantor
retains investment control over the corpus, providing that the assets comprising the corpus do not consist of stock of a corporation in which the grantor
has significant voting control.8 6 The court thus concluded that investment
control should not be significant in testing ownership.
The court failed to fully address the fact that the investment control
sanctioned by the grantor-trust provisions is necessarily limited to the situation
where the grantor may not revoke the trust for at least 10 years.8 7 The investment annuity contract at issue contained both a partial and total cash
surrender option prior to annuitization. Such an option serves to defeat the
court's analogy to the grantor-trust provisions.
The court noted that the very nature of a cash surrender option limits the
policyholder to receipt of money rather than the wrapped assets. The court
asserted that since the policyholder forfeits the right to the assets, a significant
incident of ownership is thereby divested.88 For several reasons, this logic is
patently incorrect.
First, the court did not mention that the original investment may have
been cash, which is exactly what would be returned in a cash surrender situation. Second, the revocable transfer provision does not require that the
79. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
80. For the purposes of this analysis money will be considered income producing property
for the reason that it is readily converted into the income producing assets in an investment
annuity account.
81. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).
82. Id. at 335-36.
83. Id. at 336.
84. Investment Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 685.
85. See supra note 2.
86. I.R.C. § 675 (1976).
87. I.R.C. § 678 (1976).
88. 442 F. Supp. at 690-91.
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grantor revest himself in the assets; rather, the right to withdraw a cash
amount from a trust following liquidation of the trust assets is a sufficient
power of revocation. 9 Until annuitization occurs, therefore, the policyholder
has a right equivalent to the prohibited power to revoke a trust. Accordingly,
the district court's conclusion that an investment annuity contract would pass
muster under grantor-trust provisions is in error.
The cash surrender option alone is not dispositive of the issue of tax
ownership of the assets in an investment annuity account. Most deferred
variable annuities contain cash surrender options.90 A cash surrender option
is only one power retained by the policyholder, and the Supreme Court in
Clifford emphasized that the aggregate of retained controls is to be tested.9In Clifford, the Supreme Court emphasized that tax ownership does not
change if the transferor retains "[t]he substance of full enjoyment of all the
rights which he previously had in the property." 92 Thus, if the policyholder
is in a substantially identical economic position after the transfer as that
which existed prior to the transfer, then that transfer should not be recognized
for federal tax purposes. In Investment Annuity, Inc., the government strongly
urged that the annuitant's position had not significantly changed due to the
aggregate impact of the retained controls. A major flaw in the district court's
logic was that instead of applying this aggregate test, the court dealt with the
retained controls on an individual basis. This approach is clearly contrary
to the Supreme Court's test in Clifford, which looked to "[t]he aggregate" to
determine whether the taxpayer retained a fair equivalent of his pre-transfer
93
inddents of ownership.
If the rights of an investment annuity policyholder are tested in the
aggregate, the government's argument is more credible. Before the annuity is
purchased, the taxpayer may possess funds which he is free to invest in any
asset, whether productive or not. Further, upon purchase of the asset, the
taxpayer is free to sell that asset and reinvest the funds. If the taxpayer
purchases an investment annuity, the resultant economic position is almost
identical. Under the terms of the policy, the taxpayer is free to select an investment in a broad variety of approved assets. Even if he wished to place the
money in a non-approved asset, he could exercise the surrender option, pay a
minimal fee, and receive the liquidation funds. Thus, in both situations the
money is subject to the taxpayer's discretion. The fact that he cannot receive
the account in kind does not substantially change the economic reality, since
the assets will consist of intangible property useful only for income production
to the taxpayer. Obviously, this function is not affected by whether the taxpayer directly possesses the indicia of ownership himself or possesses them
indirectly through an annuity.
89. See Coursey v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1068, 1070 (1936). See also Rev. Rul. 548,
1971-2 C.B. 250, 251.
90. Withdrawals from annuities are generally treated as return of original capital on a
first in, first out basis. I.R.C. § 72(e)(lXb) (1976).
91. Clifford, 309 U.S. at 336.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The only significant difference between annuity purchaser's position and
that of a direct investor, is initial and subsequent loading charges charged
to the annuity investor. Loading charges are completely earned by the
company when paid; therefore a policyholder may never recoup these costs.
The annuitant incurs these expenses in exchange for the right to annuity
payments at a future date. If the policyholder exercises the cash surrender
option, the right to annuity payments in the future is forfeited, and the
policyholder cannot buy into another annuity without incurring additional
loading charges. The district court concluded that this result indicates that
the policyholder's economic position was substantially different from that of
direct investment. 94 However, this conclusion is debatable.
The loading fee can be viewed as a payment for investment and retirement
planning. So viewed, the charges are comparable to charges incurred for the
advice of tax consultants and investment managers. Arguably, an investor
who pays an annuity load charge is in the same position as an investor who
obtains retirement or portfolio advice. Further, the load charge does not really
affect the policyholder's position with relation to the assets in the account,
and this relation is at the heart of the Clifford rationale. In Investment
Annuity, Inc., the government was correct in concluding that the policyholder's
economic position had not substantially changed. The aggregate retained
rights were simply too complete in the investment annuity contract to warrant
a decision that ownership bad shifted.
3. Constructive Receipt and the Investment Annuity.
In support of Revenue Ruling 77-85, the government argued that constructive receipt was applicable to income earned by assets wrapped by the
investment annuity. 95 While the constructive receipt theory is a distinct
alternative to tax ownership, it is overridden by Congress's decision to tax the
insurer on income earned during the accumulation period at special rates if
the insurance company is the tax owner of the wrapped assets. 96 Therefore, the

constructive receipt doctrine must yield to the statutory provisions of insurance
taxation if tax ownership is found to rest with the insurer.9
Because the policyholder of the investment annuity is the true tax owner
of the wrapped assets, there is no statutory bar to the application of constructive
receipt theory. The government argued in Investment Annuity, Inc. that constructive receipt was applicable to any income earned in an investment
annuity. 9s Essentially, the government contended that because the policyholder
94. Investment Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 690-91.
95. Brief for Appellant at 43, 48, Investment Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C.
1971). This point was raised on appeal, but because the court of appeals reversed on procedural grounds, the issue was not addressed.
96. See I.R.C. § 802 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (illustrating congressional intent to tax
insurance companies on income earned by investments they own). When read in conjunction
with I.R.C. § 72 (1976), which taxes the policyholder on annuitization, I.R.C. § 802 overrides
the constructive receipt theory.
97. Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 761 (1961).
98. Brief for Appellant at 43, 48, Investment Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1977).
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had the right of partial cash surrender, he could remove an amount equal to
the earned income annually and only be taxed when the aggregate withdrawals exceeded the original contribution. 99 Under the rules of constructive
receipt, this income would be currently taxable because it was earned, set aside,
and not subject to substantial limitations due to the lack of a significant withdrawal penalty. However, the policyholder might argue the inapplicability of
constructive receipt based on the front loading charge. The argument is that
each cash withdrawal represents an incremental decrease in the funds which
will be available upon annuitization. Thus, the policyholder has reduced the
insurance protection against insufficient retirement income, and forfeited the
loading charge attributable to that amount. 00
This argument breaks down if the loading charge is seen as attributable to
amounts contributed to the policyholder's account rather than income earned
by account assets. Absent a significant penalty for withdrawal, the policyholder
should be deemed to be in constructive receipt of income earned. This
conclusion is only possible, however, when the policyholder is the tax owner
of the account assets, thereby rendering the statutory mandates of section 802
and section 72 inapplicable.' 0'
Revenue Rulings 80-274 and 81-225
1. Tax Ownership.
The basic premise behind the Service's position in Revenue Rulings 80274 and 81-225 was enunciated in Helvering v. Clifford, which based tax
ownership on a finding that a taxpayer must be in a substantially different
position after the transfer. This basic Clifford language, however, was extended
in the annuity revenue rulings. The Service asserted that the policyholder's
position must differ from what it would have been had he purchased the
assets directly rather than through an annuity.10 2 This extension seems to
reflect a dual policy on the part of the IRS. First, the Clifford rule would be
ineffectual if a taxpayer could satisfy the test of being in a different economic
position by simply transferring cash into a trust, and ordering the trust to
purchase a particular asset. The language of the case clearly indicates that
the required change in position is measured against the "[b]undle of rights
retained.' 10 3 Thus, the Service correctly focused on the relative positions of the
policyholder investing funds directly or indirectly through an annuity.
99. See I.R.C. § 72(e)(1)(B) (1976).
100. This argument has been cited as another rationale for the non-application of constructive receipt doctrines to annuities. See Caplin, Taxing Tax-Deferred Annuities: A
Critique of the 1978 Carter Proposal, 1978 INs. L.J. 329, 832.
101. See supra note 96.

102. "Under the annuity contract, the policyholder's position is substantially identical
to what the policyholder's position would have been had the investment been directly maintained or established with the savings and loan association." Rev. Rul. 274, 1980-2 C.B. 27,
28-29.
"The policyholders' position in each of these situations is substantially identical to what
his or her position would have been had the mutual fund shares been purchased directly."
Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-41 I.R.B. 20.
103. Clifford, 309 U.S. at 837.
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The Service's reliance oil the Clifford language to support its direct-versusindirect investment distinction is also an extension of another policy. As
evidenced by the 1978 proposal to deny favorable tax treatment to deferred
annuities, the Service is attempting to restrict preferential tax treatment to
annuities performing a retirement function. The IRS has acted to prohibit
an annuitant with tax deferred treatment from having the same investment
options as an investor who will invest directly and pay tax on income as
earned. Both recent rulings support these policies.
In Revenue Ruling 80-274, the annuity was used to wrap interest earned
by a certificate of deposit, or a mutual fund which was held in the depositor's
account by the savings and loan association. The policyholder had both a
partial and total cash surrender option up to annuitization. The Service
asserted that the policyholder's position was substantially identical to what it
04
would have been under a direct account with the savings and loan association.
Assuming that the particular contract does not require a loading charge greatly
in excess of an investment counselor's fee, nor a substantial penalty for
exercise of the surrender option, the Service's position is essentially correct.
The fact that the annuitant's contract is with the insurer rather than the
bank should be of no tax significance since the rights retained are ultimately
the same as those of a direct depositor, even though exercisable only through
the insurer.105 In effect, the Service's position embodies the proposition that
absence of investment control alone is insufficient to switch tax ownership.
Rather, the focus is on the taxpayer's economic position in relation to the
wrapped assets.
Essentially, the same analysis is applicable to the conclusions of Revenue
Ruling 81-225; however, the issues are more complex. The Service again stated
that the policyholder's position did not substantially differ from that of a
direct investor in a mutual fund. This argument is obviously the core of the
distinction between an annuity involving a mutual fund available to the
general public and an annuity involving a mutual fund available only through
the purchase of an annuity contract. The distinction has credence when
considered in light of the logic of Revenue Rulings 77-85 and 80-274. The
indirect purchase of mutual funds available to the general public creates a
contact similar to an investment annuity. The fact that the policyholder owns
the mutual fund shares indirectly is of no consequence since any mutual fund
involves indirect ownership.
Revenue Ruling 81-225 stated that management of a mutual fund by an
individual other than the taxpayer is inconsequential because the shares of
the mutual fund themselves are the proper focal point of analysis. 106 This
104. See supra note 102.
105. "[I]t makes no difference that such 'command' may be exercised through specific
retention of legal title or the creation of a new equitable but controlled interest, or the
maintenance of effective benefit through the interposition of a subservient agency." Griffiths

v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1939).
106. "Although a mutual fund's diversified portfolio of securities is controlled by the
manager of the mutual fund and not by the policyholder, this does not distinguish these
situations from Rev. Ruls. 77-85 and 80-274 because the mutual fund shares themselves
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analysis appears correct since the taxpayer's economic position with respect
to the mutual fund shares should be different under an annuity contract in
order to avoid the Clifford rules. However, while investment control is one
factor to be considered in determining tax ownership,1 0 7 a change in economic
position is required to shift tax ownership.1 0
Under the initial situation considered in Revenue Ruling 81-225, the
issuer was allowed to switch mutual funds at its discretion. This is important
since the policyholder's position is arguably dissimilar to a direct purchase of
the particular mutual fund shares. The issuer, not the policyholder, is entitled
to substitute mutual fund shares, so that the policyholder is not always
guaranteed that his funds will be invested in the mutual fund originally
selected. The policyholder of such an annuity might argue that substantial
rights incident to ownership have thus been relinquished.
This argument is credible. The annuitant who purchases an annuity
contract, as described in Revenue Ruling 81-225, has no guarantee that the
mutual fund shares which formed his original account will remain in his
account. By contrast, a direct investor is allowed to select and retain the mutual
fund which is most compatible with his investment objectives and criteria.
The IRS has thus extended the sweep of Revenue Ruling 81-225 too far.
The policyholder's economic position has surely changed when control over
the annuity investment is relinquished. The Service is attacking all deferred
variable annuities despite congressional intent to protect some of them.
THE RESULT OF THE RULINGS: CHAOS

Immediate Issues:Implementation
of Revenue Ruling 81-225
The most pressing current issue is how to implement Revenue Ruling
81-225.1 Although the Service stated that annuities may wrap mutual funds
unavailable to the general public, no guidelines were set forth. The industry
will probably respond by directing annuity investments to mutual funds that
are slightly different than those available to the investing public. The critical

question is how different must the contrived mutual funds be from those
offered to the general public. Arguably, the entire effect of the ruling could
be avoided by including some low risk, low yield investments in mutual funds
are securities the incidents of ownership of which may be attributed to the policyholder
in these situations." Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-41 I.R.B. 19, 20.
107. The Clifford Court looked to the aggregate impact of the retained control, five year
reversion and the fact the income from the trust was to support the grantor's wife. 309 U.S.
at 335.
108. Id. at 335-36.
109. Revenue Ruling 82-55, 1982-14 I.R.B. 6, recently issued to clarify Revenue Ruling
81-225, stated that policyholders may direct allocation of invested funds among various
mutual funds if such funds are unavailable to the general public. The Clifford rationale so
viewed as extending to particularized investment decisions and not selection of a "broad iniestment strategy." This distinction is logical since any policyholder can control the broad
nvestment strategy by selecting an annuity wrapping a mutual fund that is compatible with

tis investment criteria.
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available only through annuities, yet allocating only a fraction of the overall
investment to such funds. Alternatively, such funds could contain differing
investments with identical expected returns. Where the Service will draw the
line remains uncertain.
Another aspect of Revenue Ruling 81-225 is unclear. The ruling granted
tax deferral to a non-public mutual fund managed by the insurance company.
It is uncertain whether the ruling forbids insurance companies from shifting
annuity investments from non-public mutual funds to public mutual funds.110
Although the ruling does not expressly prohibit this, the IRS would probably
argue that it does so implicitly.
Arguably, an insurer could still offer annuities that would wrap investments available to the general public and even allow investment control by
short circuiting the tax ownership principles. An annuity could embody the
major tax benefits of an investment annuity by providing for a large penalty
upon withdrawal or simply negating the cash surrender option. Of course,
such a contract would only be attractive to a taxpayer who truly desires to
use the deferred annuity as supplemental retirement income, since the funds
would be committed for the deferral period. However, this is a modest price
for tax deferral on an investment revenue which the taxpayer may control.
CONCLUSION

If the Service extends the logic of its distinction between mutual funds
available to the general public, and those available only to annuitants, the
next step may be a ruling prohibiting an annuity issuer from tying a segregated asset account to any particular investment or investment group. The
Service may rule that only variable annuities tied into the issuer's general investment experience may avoid the Clifford rules. Such a ruling would be the
Service's ultimate expression of opposition to annuities performing an investment function. Annuitants would be precluded from shopping for policies
wrapping particularly attractive investments.
Congress should establish guidelines delineating the amount of control
an annuitant may retain over wrapped investments. Just as Clifford triggered
passage of the comprehensive grantor trust provisions, Investment Annuity,
Inc. and the subsequent revenue rulings it fostered should trigger comprehensive annuity legislation.
GAIR PETRIE
110. This was allowed in situation 5 of Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-41 I.R.B. 20 because the
option was contained in situation I and situation I formed the basis of situation 5.
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